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T he inadequacies of social protection in Latin America and the 
Caribbean reveal a clear need for more active fiscal policies in this area. 
Although economic growth and decent employment are indispensable 
preconditions for social progress, the need for financing from public 
expenditure is ineluctable in the medium term. The present article examines 
three ways of achieving this objective. The first is to close the tax gap, since 
the fiscal burden is low in most Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
The second is to construct budgeting systems capable of removing rigidities 
and reallocating public spending, thereby helping to improve its quality. 
The third is to bring social expenditure evaluation mechanisms into general 
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Although there is still some time to go, it seems safe to 
say that most of the region’s countries will find it very 
difficult to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
for 2015 unless special policies are deployed for the 
purpose. To take just the first goal, halving extreme 
poverty and hunger, the countries (particularly the 
lower-income ones) will have to achieve high rates of 
growth, a task that would be facilitated by better income 
distribution (ECLAC, 2005). Another pressing issue is 
that, when it comes to social security and protection, 
population coverage is severely inadequate everywhere 
in the region (ECLAC, 2006).
Even in a context of tight borrowing constraints, 
there seems to be no getting away from the need 
for a significant rise in public funding to deal with 
these demands in the medium term. Three concurrent 
methods may be proposed for attaining this objective: 
(i) increasing the tax take, (ii) shifting the composition 
of spending towards social programmes, and (iii) freeing up 
resources by improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public projects and programmes. There can be no 
one right answer in such diverse circumstances. In one 
country or situation it may be necessary to increase 
the tax burden, either through new taxes or through 
more efficient collection. In others, it may be more 
appropriate to aim for a higher quality of expenditure, 
in terms both of allocation and of efficiency and 
effectiveness.
These are the issues this essay will address, in 
the belief that income distribution will not improve 
significantly in the medium term without active fiscal 
policies (and these cannot be confined to an effort 
to improve education, as proponents of a minimalist 
approach to public policies have suggested) and 
that higher social spending and the widespread use 
of “protected” public expenditure categories are 
no panacea when it comes to reducing poverty and 
inequality.
In a more constructive spirit, this article will 
emphasize the unquestionable potential of reforms to 
tax systems and administrations, of policies that use 
structural and multi-year planning rules to improve 
budgetary allocation, and of initiatives to raise the 
quality of public spending through the systematic use 
of evaluation programmes.
1. Is there scope for increasing public 
revenues?
Figure 1 presents government revenues as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and the composition 
of these revenues in 2005. In a number of countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras and Uruguay), tax revenues are 
virtually the only source of current income for central 
governments. In others (the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Peru), tax revenues are supplemented by other current 
revenues deriving from natural resources (hydrocarbons 
and mining). In Nicaragua and, to a much lesser extent, 
El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, donations 
provide significant current revenues on top of tax 
revenues. In Panama and Paraguay, other current 
revenues from service activities also supplement central 
government tax revenues.
One of the main functions of taxes is to finance 
government spending on goods and services so that, 
in the medium term, the level of revenues chosen will 
set a limit on the level of public-sector expenditure. 
Apart from the traditional recommendation to avoid 
types of taxes that distort the allocation of resources, 
economic theory offers only very limited guidance to 
the optimum size of the tax burden and the taxation 
structure employed.
Some studies have found a negative relationship 
between tax pressure, or public spending, and economic 
performance. But no firm conclusions can be reached 
about the subject: there are countries that have grown 
satisfactorily with a high level of taxes, while many 
others have combined lacklustre macroeconomic 
performance with low tax pressure. The causality 
actually seems to work the other way around: as 
countries grow, the tax base expands and the system 
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can become more progressive, so that a virtuous circle 
is set up between growth, public spending, taxation 
levels and the progressiveness of the system.
One way of telling whether tax levels and 
structures are “right” is to compare the relationship 
between taxes and gross domestic product (GDP) for 
a large number of countries. Simply comparing the 
situation in Latin America and the Caribbean with 
that in other regions of the world is very revealing 
(figure 2). In 2005, the tax burden in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
was roughly double that of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. As for composition, what is striking is the 
greater weight of direct taxes in the OECD countries, 
along with the size of social security contributions. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, indirect taxation is 
the backbone of tax systems and it has been argued that, 
with this being so, the direct tax take is systematically 
lower there than in other regions with similar rates. 
Latin America and the Caribbean has a similar level 
of tax pressure to South-East Asia, although the 
composition is very different. The Asian countries have 
a higher burden of direct taxation, while social security 
contributions are not substantial.
In making the comparison, however, some 
explanatory variables (per capita income and others) 
need to be considered. Some authors have used panel 
regressions to estimate the “tax capacity” of each 
country1 before comparing this to the actual rate. 
Although the present paper does not set out to estimate 
this capacity, the relationship between the tax take of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the per capita 
income level of the region is shown for the purposes 
of illustration (figure 3).
In 2005, the tax pressure in the region was 18% of 
GDP. It should be stressed, however, that the averages 
mask large differences between the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, some of which can be 
explained by the high dispersion of per capita income 
in the region. The central government tax burden in 
Brazil is more than 37% of GDP, a higher level than 
in the United States. The figures for Argentina and 
Uruguay are also higher than the average.
Although substantial increases in tax revenues 
were achieved during the early stage of the reforms 
in the mid-1980s, two decades later there has been 
only a slight increase on the levels prior to the debt 
FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Tax burden, 2005
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: ILPES, ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
1 See, for example, Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005) on the 
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FIGURE 2
International comparisons: Tax burden
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official figures from each country.
FIGURE 3
Latin America: Fiscal revenues and gross domestic product per inhabitant, 2005
Source: ECLAC.
crisis, with collection being very much centred on 
consumption taxes while income taxes yield little. 
Despite the effort to expand the tax base, raise rates 
and bring in surtaxes, the region is far from collecting 
as much as it needs.
Efforts have been made to attain the goal of 
neutrality by making value added tax (VAT) rates more 
homogeneous and reducing the number of exemptions.2 
In addition, marginal rates have been cut in the highest 
income tax bands. Protection for some sectors of the 
economy has likewise lessened as a result of trade 
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liberalization and the resulting consolidation of tariffs 
at generally lower levels. Internationally, the goal of 
neutrality has begun to take on greater importance 
with the proliferation of bilateral free trade treaties 
and double taxation agreements.
The goals of simplicity, meanwhile, have been 
furthered by more transparent legislation, improved 
rules and procedures and stronger administrative 
systems. In addition, some low-yielding taxes have been 
abolished. Nonetheless, duplication of functions is still 
a problem in some federal countries, with differentiated 
tax structures and collection authorities at various levels 
of government.
Where the equity of tax systems is concerned, 
there has been more emphasis on horizontal equity 
(agents with the same payment capacity should have 
the same tax burden) than on vertical equity (agents 
should have a tax burden that matches their ability to 
pay). There has been little progress with the latter.
The work of designing modern tax systems is still 
incomplete, in some countries because rates are still 
too low, in others owing to the survival of exemptions 
that distort the tax system, and in most because too 
little attention has been paid to vertical equity in the 
recent reforms. In cases where VAT is the main tax 
and is levied at a single rate, the whole system tends 
to be regressive, since lower-income sectors pay a 
proportionately larger share of taxes levied on the 
necessaries of life. Today’s tax systems are indeed 
regressive, making income distribution worse than it 
would otherwise have been once the effect of taxes is 
considered.3
It has been repeatedly claimed that the most 
important concept is the “net impact” of fiscal policy, 
with public spending being assigned the task of 
achieving progressiveness by targeting the poorest 
sectors.4 Studies show, however, that successful 
redistribution policies do more than just increase public 
social spending. Furthermore, spending with immediate 
redistributive characteristics, such as direct transfers, 
has not increased significantly either, something that 
stands in contrast to the European experience.
Although VAT has been adopted throughout the 
region, this tax presents major differences from one 
country to another in respect of both the size of the tax 
base and the rates applied in each case (i.e., the number 
of rates and their level). Concerning the former, some 
countries tax both goods and services generally, others 
tax goods and only some services, and a few apply VAT 
exclusively to goods. As for rates, a first distinction 
can be established between countries that have applied 
multiple rates (to differentiate between different types 
of consumption) and those that have adopted a single 
rate across the board. Thus, for example, Argentina, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Panama use a system of multiple rates, while the 
other countries considered use single uniform rates.
In addition, the rates in force in the region’s 
countries present two basic characteristics (table 1). 
First, there has been a general upward trend, with the 
average regional VAT take rising by three percentage 
points of GDP between 1994 and 2005. Second, the 
countries differ markedly in the rates they apply. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay apply rates 
of about 20% or more, while Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Panama and Paraguay have adopted rates of 13% or 
less, which places them below the 14.7% average.
In comparative terms, the simple average of 
VAT rates applied in the region in 2005 was almost 
five percentage points below the simple average for 
the countries of the European Union (14.7% and 
19.6%, respectively). Again, the dispersion of rates 
between countries was smaller in the European Union 
than in Latin America and the Caribbean (with a 
standard deviation of 3.0 in the first case and 4.4 in 
the second).
Furthermore, the productivity of VAT (calculated 
by taking VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP and 
dividing this by the general rate) is comparatively 
low in the region, standing at 40% in 2005 (by way 
of illustration, average productivity in the developed 
countries is over 60%). There are also large differences 
between countries in this respect, as figure 4 shows. 
In five countries (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Mexico, Panama and Peru), collection is less efficient 
than the regional average. This indicator does not 
necessarily reflect administrative eff iciency, but 
rather the dispersion of rates around the general 
rate. In Mexico, for example, dispersion is greater 
because there are exemptions for food. What the chart 
illustrates, therefore, is only the shortfall in relation to 
what could potentially be collected if there were no 
3 Gómez Sabaini, Santieri and Rossignolo (2002) reached this 
conclusion after analysing the tax structure of Argentina. The taxes 
mainly responsible for this are, in order of regressiveness, social 
security contributions, domestic goods and services taxes, and 
VAT. The most progressive taxes are those levied on personal and 
corporate earnings, together with provincial and municipal property 
taxes. These findings seem readily applicable to the rest of Latin 
America too.
4 See, for example, Martin (1997).
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exemptions. In a context where it is becoming ever 
more difficult to introduce new taxes or higher tax 
rates, the removal of exemptions and the limitation of 
tax deductions are emerging as significant sources of 
future fiscal revenue.
The term “tax expenditure” is widely used to refer 
to tax exemptions, remissions, credits, deductions, 
deferments and certain reimbursements. Broadly, tax 
expenditure can be understood as that portion of tax 
revenue which is forgone owing to the application of 
exemptions or special tax regimes whose purpose is to 
favour or stimulate particular sectors, activities, regions 
or agents in the economy.
More and more countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are supplying information on tax expenditure. 
The amounts are very significant in all cases, with the 
2003 figures showing a low of 1.6% of GDP in Brazil 
and a high of 9.2% in Colombia. Of the taxes giving 
rise to tax expenditure, VAT predominated in Argentina, 
Ecuador and Peru and income tax in Chile. Concerning 
the destination of this spending, in Argentina 80% of 
tax expenditure (2.8% of GDP) went on forms of special 
treatment provided for in the relevant tax laws and 
the remainder on benefits provided under the different 
economic, regional and sectoral promotion regimes. 
In Chile, tax expenditure (4.4% of GDP) took place 
mainly in the financial sector (61.3%), the property 
sector (12.6%) and education (7.4%).
TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Value added tax (VAT) rates
 1994  2000  2005
Argentina  18 21 21
Bolivia 14.92 14.92 13
Brazil  20.48 20.48 20.48
Chile 18 18 19
Colombia 14 15 16
Costa Rica 8 13 13
Ecuador 10 12 12
El Salvador 10 13 13
Guatemala 7 10 12
Haiti 10 10 10
Honduras 7 12 12
Mexico 10 15 15
Nicaragua 10 15 15
Panama 5 5 5
Paraguay 10 10 10
Peru 18 18 19
Dominican Republic 6 8 16
Uruguay 22 23 23
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 10 15.5 15
Average for Latin America 
and the Caribbean 11.7 14.2 14.7
Standard deviation for 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 5.1 4.6 4.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information from each 
country.
FIGURE 4
Latin America and the Caribbean: Productivity of value added tax (VAT), 2005
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In the 1990s, better economic growth rates led 
to a recovery in the tax burden. In most cases, the 
elasticity of tax revenue is higher than one. In the 
upswings of the cycle, this is because growth expands 
the formal economy and generates a disproportionate 
increase in imports and the taxes associated with them. 
Conversely, in recessive phases the tax take also falls 
disproportionately because the above mechanisms 
are reversed and also because evasion increases 
substantially. The relationship between inflation and tax 
revenues is also a powerful one. First, because inflation 
reduces the real value of tax revenues owing to the time 
lag between the time taxes are generated and the time 
they are collected. Second, because inflation reduces 
real incomes, which means families and businesses will 
try to maintain their real disposable income by paying 
less tax. Thus, macroeconomic stability, meaning a 
combination of high growth and low inflation, is the 
principal requirement for higher tax revenues. When 
the environment is recessive and inflation on the rise, 
any tax system will be hard pressed to prevent revenues 
from declining.
Meanwhile, tax policy implementation requires 
an institutional framework and specific arrangements 
appropriate to the functions and objectives being pursued. 
In particular, the collection of revenue from internal 
taxes, customs duties and social security contributions 
requires an administrative mechanism that meets certain 
minimum conditions of institutional status and internal 
organization if it is to be able to work properly. The tax 
administration, therefore, needs to guard against the 
institutional weaknesses that commonly affect public 
agencies of various types. In recent years, indeed, 
recognition of this fact has resulted in the adoption of 
administrative reforms to raise the institutional status of 
tax administrations and place them under the leadership 
of high-ranking officials. Great progress has also been 
made in strengthening the institutional basis of tax 
administrations by creating legal structures that provide 
them with varying degrees of functional, administrative, 
technical and financial independence.
In any event, the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean still have a long way to go in terms of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their tax administrations, 
especially when compared to more developed countries. 
The fact is that, although tax administrations in the 
region operate with fewer budgetary and human 
resources, their collection costs are higher than those 
of their counterparts in more developed countries.
This rapid review of the public revenue situation 
does provide some answers to the first question. Yes, it 
is possible to detect scope for increasing tax revenues, 
especially in the current environment of strong 
economic growth. Rates are comparatively low in some 
countries, especially for VAT and specific taxes. There 
are also exemptions that can be reviewed.
In this analysis, two peculiarities of the region’s tax 
systems are of particular importance. The first is the VAT 
treatment of food. Exemptions for this reduce the tax 
take by up to two points in some countries, as they do 
not discriminate between a basket of staples and other 
foods. It has been argued that replacing these measures 
with targeted spending policies would be beneficial in 
net terms. However, it remains to be shown whether, 
in terms of redistribution, such policies are better than 
direct exemptions for a basket of staple foodstuffs, in 
countries where this basket represents a significant 
proportion of family consumption for many people. 
The second peculiarity is the growing importance of tax 
incentives in free trade zones, especially those granted to 
maquila companies in the countries of Central America.5 
Although their positive impact on employment is 
undeniable, consolidation of this production regime goes 
against the principle of horizontal tax equity and, when 
these activities have few backward linkages, reduces the 
income-elasticity of tax systems.
In addition to these restrictions, there is the impact 
of free trade agreements and regional integration on 
tax revenues. The consequent reduction of taxes on 
external trade can exceed one point of GDP in some 
cases. Just replacing these taxes may involve complex 
political battles, leaving little room for net increases 
in tax revenue.
Lastly, it is possible to affirm that the institutional 
strength of tax administrations has now increased to 
a point where, in the short term, any further gains 
yield decreasing returns in terms of tax collection. 
The fact is that high levels of evasion and avoidance 
are closely related to the degree of informality in the 
region’s economies, which in turn is strongly correlated 
with growth and income levels. Reducing evasion is 
therefore a structural task inherent in the development 
process, and not just a matter of administration or 
short-term management improvements. Relying on a 
rapid decrease in evasion as a mechanism for financing 
social policies, or on economic growth alone, would 
have very risky implications for the stability of the 
public finances.
5 See Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005) for an extensive analysis 
of tax systems in these countries.
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Expanded coverage for social protection programmes 
will not be achieved solely through better tax collection. 
If the aim is to redirect resources to the social area, then 
a hard but urgent task is to improve the productivity 
and quality of public spending.
1. The public spending dynamic
Public spending as a percentage of GDP is commonly 
used as an indicator to measure the State’s share of 
the economy, although it does not take account of 
the regulatory activity conducted by governments. As 
figure 5 shows, the “incrementalism” that characterized 
the budgetary process in the OECD countries and laid 
the basis for the welfare State has been progressively 
replaced by a “decrementalism” characterized by the 
setting of macrofiscal rules and multi-year targets for 
deficit reduction and public spending restraint. Public 
spending also has a clearly countercyclical character, 
so that spending constraints in periods of expansion 
alternate with a larger role for the State when the level 
of activity slows.
In Europe, the large rise in public spending in 
the 1970s was basically due to the establishment of 
the welfare State, which more recently has taken 
the form of monetary transfers including pensions, 
unemployment benefits, education and health care. 
Transfers increased by 5.7 points of GDP on average 
in the 1970-2004 period, and have stabilized at around 
18 points of GDP. In the aggregate, the composition 
of public spending has shifted from the categories 
of general services (including interest payments) and 
economic affairs towards health and social protection. 
The data do not show any major reduction in the size 
of the welfare State in recent years.
Although the level of spending is much lower in 
the United States, it has followed a path very much like 
the one described, with a stage of growth during the 
1980s and one of reduction during the 1990s. Over the 
coming decades, however, public spending on health 
and pensions is expected to grow strongly (by some 10 
points of GDP) as a result of population aging. Again, 
the size of the State in Japan has grown strongly to 
reach over 35 points of GDP.
II
Public spending and social protection
FIGURE 5
International comparisons: Public spending, 1970-2004
(Percentages of GDP)
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To obtain a fuller picture of the changing size of 
the State in Latin America and the Caribbean, measured 
by public spending as a proportion of GDP, it is worth 
examining other definitions of government (table 2), 
particularly general government and the non-financial 
public sector. The first concept (general government) 
is particularly important in certain federally organized 
countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, where a 
substantial part of public spending takes place at the 
provincial and state level, respectively. The concept of 
the non-financial public sector, meanwhile, is a more 
useful one when it comes to grasping the variety of 
organizational and financial structures that emerged 
from the structural reforms of the 1990s.
To take a simple average, public spending as a 
proportion of GDP was 19.5% in 2005, having increased 
by almost four percentage points of GDP between 1990 
and 2003 for the central government category (19 
countries); between 2003 and 2005, public spending 
fell by 0.8 percentage points of GDP. For the general 
government category (nine countries), public spending 
was 24.2% of GDP in 2005 and grew by almost two 
percentage points of GDP in the 1990-2003 period. As 
regards the non-financial public sector category (14 
countries), public spending was 28.5% of GDP in 2005 
and rose by 2.4 percentage points of GDP in the 1990-
2005 period. The largest drops were in Chile, Mexico 
and Peru, for the definitions of government available.
In one group of countries (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay), there was a significant increase in 
public spending at the central government level between 
1990 and 2005. This dynamic could be characterized 
as upward convergence, since in 1990 public spending 
as a proportion of GDP was well below the regional 
average. In general, the causes of this expansion in 
public spending as a proportion of GDP are to be 
sought in a movement towards decentralization and 
increases in social security benefits and coverage. 
In some cases, decentralization has increased the 
weight of central government (Colombia) because the 
financing of subnational bodies has depended heavily 
on transfers, or has led to significant growth in general 
TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Change in the size of the State, 
by definition of government, 1990-2005
(Percentages of GDP)
 Public spending, 2005 Change from 1990 (points of GDP)
 Central General Non-financial Central General  Non-financial
 government government public sector government government public sector
Argentina 16.6 24.7 25.2 4.8 -1.6 2.7
Bolivia 29.0 28.9 30.0 11.5 6.5 -5.1
Brazil 24.6    5.9    
Chile 19.8 21.8 33.9 -1.8 -1.3 -3.1
Colombia 21.0   35.2 11.7   14.6
Costa Rica 15.9 23.4 25.5 1.0 1.8 2.7
Ecuador 17.2   24.5 2.8   -1.9
El Salvador 14.6   17.5 1.0 1.6 1.5
Guatemala 11.7     1.4 3.8  
Haiti 11.5     -0.1    
Honduras 23.0   34.1 0.2   8.3
Mexico 19.7   23.3 -0.9   -4.2
Nicaragua 23.0 27.3 30.3 1.5 4.9 6.8
Panama 19.0   24.8 1.0   1.0
Paraguay 17.5   33.3 7.4   12.0
Peru 16.7 19.2  -2.4 -1.7  
Dominican Republic 19.3     6.8    
Uruguay 23.2   29.6 7.2   1.3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 26.9   32.2 1.1   -3.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 19.5 24.2 28.5 3.2 1.8 2.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
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government, as in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Where 
the non-financial public sector is concerned, Colombia 
recorded an increase of 18 percentage points of GDP 
in the 1990-2003 period and Paraguay one of 12 
percentage points up to 2005. The non-financial public 
sector shrank in five of the 14 countries for which 
information is available.
2. The quality of public spending
Of course, the productive effects of public spending do 
not so much depend on the amount of resources used 
as on the impact achieved. In recent years, emphasis 
has been placed on poverty reduction as a priority 
goal. International agencies have made tremendous 
efforts to promote “pro-poor” budgets. The Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative was a 
unique opportunity in this respect, as it meant that the 
interest savings resulting from the reduction of external 
debt could be channelled into social spending instead. 
There is growing concern, however, about this excessive 
reliance on social spending to reduce poverty.
Most programmes focus on the composition of 
public spending, especially in social areas, placing 
less emphasis on other aspects of a broader strategy 
to stimulate growth with poverty reduction. Although 
these experiences mainly involve lower-income 
countries, the conclusions from them hold good for 
the great majority of the countries in the region: it is 
not such a small matter to associate the composition 
of public spending with poverty reduction, income 
distribution and economic growth.
The analysis becomes more complex when this last 
goal is included. The member States of the European 
Union, for example, agreed as part of the Lisbon 
strategy to strengthen the contribution of the public 
finances to growth by redirecting public expenditures 
towards physical, human and knowledge capital; in the 
case of the European Union, spending on research and 
development, education and infrastructure investment 
is more productive than other types of spending 
(European Commission, 2004). In any event, these brief 
notes show how hard it is to set priorities, even when 
explicit poverty reduction targets are set. It is enough 
to glance at the functional classification of public 
spending (table 3) to realize how enormously difficult 
it is to rank spending priorities without considering 
the specif ic characteristics of each country and 
situation. Although it is clearly important to allocate 
resources to the different social protection categories, 
it seems very hard to do this at the expense of other 
categories that are no less crucial to economic and 
social development.
When considering the quality of public spending 
in macroeconomic terms, it is possible to distinguish 
four categories, which combine the functional and 
economic classifications. Expenditures are defined 
as “efficient” when they have positive effects on 
economic growth and employment. The empirical 
evidence delivers a mixed message: the effects of 
public spending vary depending on its composition, 
are positive within moderate ranges, and can rapidly 
turn negative if certain limits are exceeded.6
This non-linear relationship between public 
spending and growth varies by the type of expenditure, 
giving rise to the four categories referred to (figure 
6). Category 1 is interest payments, represented in the 
chart by line AF; this spending has a negative effect 
on growth and employment, since any increase in it 
forces other public spending down. Category 2 includes 
spending such as public consumption and pensions, 
including survivors’ pensions, represented by line AE. 
Studies generally argue that while such spending is 
efficient up to a point, increasing it can have negative 
effects on saving, investment and growth. Category 
3, represented by line CD, illustrates the effects of 
expenditure such as unemployment insurance, or 
spending on social exclusion. Keeping spending below 
a certain level reduces macroeconomic efficiency, 
making it harder for the excluded to enter the labour 
market and holding down their participation rates. 
TABLE 3
Functional classification of public spending
 General classifiers Social protection
1. General public services 1. Sickness and incapacity
2. Defence 2. Third age
3. Public order and security 3. Survivors
4. Economic affairs 4. Families and children
5. Environmental protection 5. Unemployment
6. Housing and community services 6. Social housing
7. Health 7. Social exclusion




6 See European Commission (2002) for a detailed analysis of this 
typology.
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Furthermore, a certain level of unemployment transfers 
helps make the labour market more flexible and tends 
to reduce excessive labour protection. The relationship 
is not linear, however; a point comes where spending 
of this type starts to have a negative impact on growth. 
Category 4 includes education, health care, research 
and development, and gross fixed capital formation, 
represented by line AB. This spending is positive 
for growth and has a much higher expenditure limit 
than the other categories, although a turning point is 
eventually reached here as well.
Like any typology, this breakdown is rather 
arbitrary and has numerous limitations. It is useful for 
three purposes, however. The first is to emphasize the 
non-linear character of the macroeconomic effects of 
public spending. Thus, it would be as wrong to reject 
growth in such spending for reasons of efficiency 
as it would be to rely on it as the sole engine of 
development. It is clear that, for the vast majority of 
countries in the region, the slope of categories 2 and 3 
is positive; public spending is below its optimum level. 
This does not mean, of course, that its productivity 
might not be improved.
The second purpose served by the typology is 
to provide a more illustrative differentiation than 
the economic and functional classif ications. Just 
distinguishing between current and capital expenditure, 
important though this is, is not enough when it comes to 
attaining social and economic policy goals. Regarding 
the functional classification, the tendency to prioritize 
social spending can also be a limitation when, as 
analysed earlier, it is recognized that growth and job 
creation play an important role in poverty reduction.
The third purpose of this classif ication is to 
provide the basis of a medium-term sequence for 
improving the quality of public spending, primarily 
by reducing the burden of interest payments, which in 
some cases are as much as 50% of the approved budget. 
When these levels are reached, the priority is to return 
public debt to a sustainable path, both by generating 
primary surpluses and by working to improve internal 
and external financing conditions (ECLAC, 2004a). In 
the last five years, fortunately, the share of resources 
going to the social sectors has increased in relation to 
both total public spending and GDP. Indeed, ECLAC 
(2004a) notes that public social spending has been 
reoriented towards human capital investment (education 
and health), which has more pronounced redistribution 
and growth effects than other categories. Lastly, as 
ECLAC (2004c) pointed out recently, there is an urgent 
need to stimulate spending on infrastructure and on 
research and development, given the alarming decline 
in such expenditure during the recent cutbacks.
To summarize, it can be said that the task of 
improving the quality of public spending in Latin 
America and the Caribbean must involve sustained 
investment in physical, human and knowledge capital. 
Although progress has been made recently, major 
FIGURE 6
Quality and efficiency of public spending
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challenges still remain: continuing the effort to 
reduce the interest burden and thus free up resources, 
maintaining human capital investment, and accelerating 
spending on fixed and knowledge investment.
In a context of severe institutional rigidities, 
reorienting public spending is no easy matter. Use of a 
medium-term public spending framework can facilitate 
the necessary reallocations between categories (Shick, 
2002). In the OECD countries, indeed, this instrument 
has been used to prioritize targets for investing in 
education and raising overall productivity (Blondal, 
2005). A multi-year framework is a financial planning 
instrument whereby annual budgetary decisions are 
taken in a context of global or sectoral spending 
constraints over periods of from three to five years.
The key to success in implementing a multi-year 
framework is that the institutional mechanisms used 
should allow decision-makers to balance the aggregate 
resources available with the country’s priorities. This 
balance is struck using a top-down sectoral/ministerial 
resource allocation approach. Properly used, this 
instrument should overcome budgetary inertia and 
change the prevailing mindset from a sectoral “needs” 
approach to an “available budget” approach.
The instrument described can be useful for 
reducing budgetary rigidity insofar as it allows sectoral 
shifts to take place over time, with fewer particular 
pressures and upheavals. Although it is early days to 
rate these experiences, they are clearly a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for proper supervision 
and reallocation of public spending, as they have to 
be accompanied by macrofiscal rules that confer a 
reasonable degree of certainty upon medium-term 
projections and avoid procyclical bias in public 
spending.
3. The procyclical nature of public spending
Ideally, public spending ought to be “acyclical” (i.e., 
more or less neutral in respect of macroeconomic 
cycles) or countercyclical, with specific policies to pay 
down public debt at times of plenty, the better to cope 
with periods of scarcity. Spending decisions should 
follow an intertemporal approach, with programmes 
and projects financed over a multi-year goal horizon.
Unfortunately, this rather technocratic approach 
is by no means the one applied, owing to the extreme 
vulnerability of the region’s public finances to changes 
in the macroeconomic environment. If interest rates 
rise or public revenues fall, the authorities are obliged 
to restrain primary expenditure growth, with capital 
spending usually suffering more than current spending. 
During the six years from 1998 to 2003, in fact, 
cumulative GDP growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean was 6%, while public investment by central 
government experienced a cumulative 14% decline 
(Martner and Tromben, 2005).
There is ample empirical evidence to show that 
fiscal policies in the region have been procyclical in 
the recent past.7 Thus, it is vitally important to bring in 
countercyclical fiscal rules to set public spending on a 
stable path. There is a crucial need to take advantage of 
the current phase of growth to establish or strengthen 
mechanisms that can give public spending consistency 
over time. The fiscal responsibility laws of the early 
2000s have served to moderate the dynamic of rising 
public debt in some countries.
In only a few instances, however, has the explicit 
objective of macroeconomic rules been countercyclical. 
Funds designed to stabilize revenues from tax (Argentina, 
Peru) or raw materials (Chile, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico) are indeed explicit 
countercyclical policies, but their mere existence is not 
a sufficient guarantee. Meanwhile, legally mandated 
limits on public spending growth (3.5% a year in real 
terms in Ecuador and Peru, for instance) actually tend to 
drive spending down over time as a proportion of GDP 
if trend growth in the economies concerned is higher, 
and thus cannot be described as neutral over time.
Chile is an exception. The 1% structural surplus 
rule means that, in practice, public spending growth is 
pegged to trend GDP and also to the long-term copper 
price, which is a key variable in determining structural 
revenues (Dirección de Presupuestos de Chile, 2005), 
irrespective of short-term fluctuations in actual GDP 
and thus revenues. In theory, this ensure a stable and 
neutral spending path, reducing the likelihood of sharp 
adjustments and conferring a degree of certainty in 
practice on the multi-year implementation of public 
projects and programmes. This experience shows that 
policies not involving preallocation of spending are 
not necessarily detrimental to social expenditure in 
the long term.
4. Priority for social spending?
The vulnerability of social spending is also disturbing. 
While the procyclical bias of primary spending 
as a whole has already been mentioned, there is 
7 See Martner and Tromben (2003) for a recent analysis.
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even stronger cause for concern when it comes to 
social spending. Since this is priority expenditure, 
it is important for its hard core to be given explicit 
protection if cutbacks are unavoidable.
Column A of table 4 gives estimates for the GDP-
elasticity of social spending. The results are striking: 
as a simple average, the elasticity of social spending 
is 1.87, indicating that it is procyclical to a high 
degree. This characteristic is not common to all the 
countries, however. The value seems to depend on the 
starting point; elasticity is greater in countries where 
social spending was lower in the early 1990s (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru), in a 
context of rising expenditure across the board. This 
could also explain the lower elasticities of Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, countries that had higher social 
spending to begin with.
One thing that is crucial is to differentiate these 
elasticities from those of spending generally. Column 
B of table 4 shows the GDP-elasticity of total public 
spending, and column A/B calculates the ratio between 
the two elasticities. The countries whose total public 
spending has been most sensitive to GDP fluctuations 
are Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. Conversely, 
this elasticity is close to or less than one in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. In these 
countries, public spending has fluctuated much in line 
with economic growth.
 The third column compares the elasticities 
estimated. A value higher than one for this indicator 
shows that social spending has been more procyclical 
than other spending.8 This is what is obtained for all 
the countries except El Salvador, although the indicator 
is significant in only a few cases (Bolivia, Brazil, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru). In these countries, social 
spending has increased by substantially more than 
aggregate spending at times of expansion and has fallen 
by substantially more than aggregate spending during 
phases of recession.
TABLE 4
Latin America and the Caribbean (14 countries): Elasticity of social 
spending in relation to gross domestic producta
 Elasticity of  Elasticity of Ratio Number of
 social spending (A) total spending (B) (A/B) observations
Argentina 0.91 0.82 1.11 15
Bolivia 2.95 1.90 1.55b 15
Brazil 1.56 1.16 1.34b 15
Chile 0.93 0.73 1.27 25
Colombia 2.12 2.02 1.05 22
El Salvador 1.57 1.99 0.79 9
Guatemala 1.84 0.99 1.86b 25
Honduras 1.56 0.97 1.61b 21
Mexico 1.78 1.58 1.13 15
Paraguay 3.31 3.17 1.05 25
Peru 2.41 1.02 2.36b 15
Dominican Republic 1.60 1.46 1.10 25
Uruguay 1.82 1.64 1.11 15
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) - - - 25
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.87 1.50 1.38 
Source: Aldunate and Martner (2006), on the basis of social spending data from the ECLAC Social Development Division.
a The estimates were produced using the following equation: Log Si = α Log Si-1 + β Log GDPi + γ, where S is total spending or social 
spending and GDP is the gross domestic product of each country i, both variables measured in constant terms. Long-term elasticities 
β/(1-α) are shown.
b Cases in which both elasticities are significantly different from 5%.
8 Strictly speaking, this form of calculation does not actually 
indicate procyclicality, since the comparison should be made with 
the GDP gap and not with actual GDP. The results would probably 
not differ much.
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The question, then, is whether social spending 
should be given priority in the public budget. In many 
countries, the answer has been yes. A first option is to 
raise this priority to the very highest level. In Colombia, 
for example, article 350 of the 1990 Constitution 
provides that “public social spending will take priority 
over any other allocation”. Furthermore, another article 
provides that social spending must increase from year to 
year. The final clause of the first section of the definition 
laid down by Law 179 of 1994 includes not only specific 
activities but also “(…) those tending to the general 
welfare and a higher quality of life for the population”. 
The problem is that by laying down such an unrestricted 
principle, the article accommodates all categories that 
can be characterized as tending to the general welfare 
and a higher quality of life for the population.
A second option is to “earmark” some social 
spending, which involves preallocating a certain amount 
of resources from the public budget. In many countries 
of Latin America there are, for example, constitutionally 
mandated lower limits on health or education spending, 
generally expressed as a percentage of GDP. For all the 
good intentions of legislators, mechanisms of this type 
do not remove the procyclical bias of public spending, 
since they allow social spending to fall if the same 
thing happens to GDP. In too many cases, furthermore, 
these limits are not respected because the resources 
are simply not available and the budgets passed are 
not implemented. Earmarking public spending does 
not solve the problem, because it does not go to its 
root: the chronic inadequacy of public resources at 
times of crisis.
A third option is to “shield” some public social 
spending, which is salutary because it assumes that the 
authorities are capable of setting and applying resource 
allocation priorities despite the many pressures that 
arise in this process. A number of recent experiences 
show that it is possible to identify a hard core of social 
spending which, incidentally, contributes to governance 
throughout the system. There are still classification 
problems to complicate the task, however.
Naturally, each situation merits a different response. 
It does seem clear, though, that medium-term strategies 
need to aim at the development of explicit mechanisms 
for the protection of public spending generally so that it 
becomes possible to meet the tremendous needs arising 
in periods of recession, which unfortunately are more 
frequent than might be wished.
III
Evaluating social policies and programmes
1. The need for evaluation
In the previous section, it was pointed out that the 
effects of public spending did not depend so much 
on the amount of resources employed as on the 
impact achieved. This is a key factor to be borne in 
mind when designing social security and protection 
policies, programmes and projects. There is no point 
in increasing investment and spending in social sectors 
if the benefits generated for the country with these 
resources are lower than the costs.
If a country channels more resources into social 
security and protection, these must necessarily be 
diverted from other uses, whether in the public or the 
private sector. When resources come from reallocations 
within the public budget, it will have been necessary 
to cut allocations to some agencies to increase the 
budget of others, implying a quantitative or qualitative 
drop in the provision of certain public services. For 
example, if an increase in the budget allocated to the 
Ministry of Health is funded by reducing the budget of 
the Ministry of Mines, the latter might have to reduce 
support for small-scale mining or for exploration, with 
all the resultant costs for the country in terms of lower 
production in the present or future, less employment 
and greater poverty.
If resources come from higher tax rates or lower 
tax avoidance, on the other hand, then they will have 
been diverted from alternative uses in the private 
sector. If these resources would otherwise have gone 
into productive activities, forgoing these will entail an 
opportunity cost to the country equal to the value set 
by society on the goods or services that could have 
been produced. If the additional resources collected 
were going to be used for private consumption, there 
will also be a cost in the form of lower consumer 
satisfaction and lower aggregate demand for goods 
and services. There is room for debate about the costs 
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and benefits of such cutbacks in consumption, but it 
is important to recognize that lower consumption will 
almost always have a cost for society.
The cost is even starker if the additional resources 
come from borrowing, as there will be interest and 
commissions to pay. Furthermore, higher borrowing 
by the country will increase lending rates in general, 
affecting the productive sector. Fewer projects will be 
started, and the contribution made by new productive 
jobs to poverty reduction will consequently be less.
It is clear, then, that irrespective of the origin of 
the resources used to increase investment and spending 
on social security and protection, there will be a 
cost for society. Accordingly, the benefits generated 
by programmes and projects will have to be at least 
equivalent to the costs incurred if the country and its 
inhabitants are not to end up poorer than before.
This explains the concern discussed earlier about 
the possible constraints arising from the tendency to 
prioritize social spending, once the important poverty 
reduction role played by growth and job creation is 
recognized. Draining resources from activities that 
generate productive jobs will only be justified if the 
benefits created by allocating them to social security 
and protection programmes or projects are greater than 
those that would have accrued from the productive 
activities forgone.
Another concern is how resources should be 
allocated to maximize their impact. As was pointed out 
in the previous section, the effects of public spending 
vary according to its composition, are positive within 
moderate ranges, and can turn negative if certain limits 
are exceeded. There is a need, then, to work out how far 
spending can usefully be raised in each of the sectors 
associated with social security and protection, so that 
resources are allocated only up to the point where higher 
spending leads to lower efficiency. In situations of 
limited resources, furthermore, intersectoral allocation 
should aim to stop short of the zone in which efficiency 
is still positive but declining.
To avoid overallocating resources to a particular 
sector, it is necessary to know what effect marginal 
programmes and projects will have on key development 
indicators such as life expectancy, the educational level 
of the population, sickness rates and per capita income 
(and its distribution). Estimating these effects is not 
easy, and it is harder still to know when diminishing 
or negative efficiency levels have been reached.
Lastly, a third concern is to be able to identify, 
in any given sector, the programmes or projects that 
are most efficient in terms of achieving the maximum 
impact with limited resources. Needs usually far exceed 
the potential for satisfying them, and large sections 
of the population are left with unmet basic needs (in 
health care, education, housing and so on). In these 
circumstances, it is important to be able to prioritize 
the programmes and projects proposed, so that those 
with the best cost-benefit ratios can be implemented 
first. This will ensure the greatest impact for the limited 
resources available.
Evaluation is the tool available for attempting a 
response to concerns about the amount of resources 
to be spent on social security and protection, their 
allocation between sectors, and the projects and 
programmes to be undertaken. Policies, programmes 
or projects are evaluated in an effort to assess their 
value, meaning the difference between the total benefits 
and total costs of the initiative. And here, a question 
immediately arises: their value for whom?
Depending on the answer, there are two types of 
evaluation: private and social. Private evaluation seeks 
to ascertain the value of the project or programme for a 
person, a company or an institution. Social evaluation, 
on the other hand, seeks to determine the value of the 
initiative for the country, i.e., for society as a whole.
To determine the value of an initiative it is 
necessary to identify, quantify and value all the 
“relevant” costs and benefits associated with it over 
its life cycle. By relevant costs we mean those that 
are incurred if the programme or project is executed, 
but that would not have to be incurred if it were not. 
Similarly, relevant benefits will be those that can only 
be obtained by executing the programme or project.
It is also necessary to distinguish between ex ante, 
mid-term, final and ex post evaluations. The purpose 
of ex ante evaluation is to determine whether or not 
it is advisable to undertake the initiative. Mid-term 
evaluation is to find out whether the initiative is worth 
continuing with and, if so, in what respects it can be 
improved. Final evaluation is to provide information 
about the fulfilment of objectives and to benefit from 
lessons learned during execution. Lastly, learning is 
the main purpose of ex post evaluation, which covers 
everything that happened with the initiative from its 
conception to the evaluation date.
The multiplicity of evaluation approaches and 
techniques, the existence of different types of evaluation, 
the differences that arise when initiatives in different 
sectors are evaluated and the difficulties inherent in 
any evaluation all make the task of ascertaining and 
comparing the value of different government initiatives 
a complex one. It is therefore indispensable to have 
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qualified staff and methodologies to facilitate and 
standardize the work of the assessors. Furthermore, 
given the number and diversity of initiatives proposed 
or being implemented in any budgetary period, the 
work of evaluating all programmes and projects takes 
resources and a good level of organization. National 
systems of public investment, which now exist or are 
being developed in almost all the region’s countries, are 
a reflection of this. These are described and analysed 
in the following section.
2. Evaluation in the social sectors
The theory and practice of private and social project 
evaluation were originally developed to ascertain 
the value of industrial or agricultural-type projects. 
Consequently, there is a large body of experience and 
literature dealing with the evaluation of projects such 
as power stations, industries and irrigation systems. 
Transport is another field in which evaluation has long 
been widely applied.
Evaluation has a long track record in the health 
sector, but with the focus on the effectiveness of 
different types of treatments or drugs. Only recently 
has the economic variable been incorporated into the 
analysis. In the education sector, too, there is a century 
and more of experience with the evaluation of learning 
outcomes, but the evaluation of programmes or projects 
from a socio-economic perspective is also a recent 
development. In both health and education, this is due 
to the great difficulty of setting a monetary value on the 
benefits that programmes and projects generate.
In other sectors, such as justice and citizen 
security, there is very little evaluation experience 
and socio-economic evaluation criteria are hardly 
ever applied. On the whole, the sectors concerned 
with social assistance and protection are very badly 
served when it comes to evaluation methodologies and 
capabilities. This puts them at a disadvantage when they 
have to defend budgetary allocations, since it is hard 
for them to demonstrate what benefits will be generated 
from the resources allocated to them.
Among the factors accounting for this slowness 
to adopt evaluation as a decision-making instrument 
in the social sectors are a lack of trained personnel, 
the absence of specific methodologies and, to some 
degree, the lower priority traditionally given to these 
sectors.
Evaluating social assistance and protection 
initiatives in socio-economic terms is not straightforward. 
The costs of programmes or projects can almost always 
be determined fairly accurately. Most of the benefits 
are very difficult to value in monetary terms, however. 
A variety of methodological approaches have been 
adopted to get around this difficulty.
The most common and straightforward is to accept 
how difficult it is to set a monetary value on the benefits 
generated by social programmes or projects and seek 
lowest-cost solutions. The problem with this approach is 
that it is only useful for choosing between alternatives 
that generate identical benefits and does not provide 
any indication as to whether the value of the initiative 
is positive, since only the costs are known. The benefits 
can be identified and perhaps quantified, but they are 
not valued, so to assume that their value exceeds the 
costs requires an act of faith.
Another methodological alternative, known as 
cost-effectiveness, seeks to determine the cost of 
producing a certain impact on some relevant variable. 
In other words, the aim is to calculate a cost per unit 
of benefit, such as cost per health-care service provided, 
or cost for each percentage point reduction in the 
incidence of a certain disease.
The above two approaches are the ones most 
widely used in the region’s countries. Bolivia, Chile and 
Peru, for example, all regularly apply methodologies 
based upon them.
Yet another methodological alternative is contingent 
valuation. This method aims to ascertain people’s 
willingness to pay for the benefits generated by the 
programme or project concerned by conducting 
surveys among a sample of potential beneficiaries. 
This methodology has been used mainly in research 
work, owing to the cost of executing surveys and the 
difficulty of designing them in a way that avoids bias 
in the opinions expressed.
One problem with applying this methodological 
approach in the social assistance and protection field 
is that the willingness of poor people to pay for certain 
services may be very low. For example, a family that 
barely manages to subsist on the combined income 
of all its members is unlikely to be willing to pay for 
education. Consequently, if the value set on a good or 
service by a group of poor beneficiaries is determined, 
it is very likely to be low. Then, if the benefits of the 
project are assessed by the value set upon them by the 
poor beneficiary group, the conclusion is very likely 
to be that it is unprofitable for the country.
This goes against the general perception that 
projects providing social assistance and protection to 
very disadvantaged sections of the population are highly 
beneficial to a country. The apparent contradiction was 
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addressed by professor Arnold Harberger, who proposed 
the basic needs approach as a way of understanding it. 
The reasoning behind this approach is that there is a 
positive externality for society when poor groups are 
able to consume goods or services deemed essential 
for a decent life. In other words, certain groups in 
society are willing to pay for a programme or project, 
without themselves being beneficiaries of it, so that 
this can provide essential goods or services to the most 
vulnerable groups. This approach, then, recognizes and 
seeks to set a monetary value on the altruism which 
many people share.
Unfortunately, this methodological approach is 
also difficult to apply in practice owing to lack of 
information. The willingness of the poor to pay for 
basic goods or services is not known, much less the 
value that non-poor population groups set on the 
consumption of the poor. The theoretical soundness 
of this method, however, and its great potential for 
application, mean that it is one whose use should be 
promoted in social assistance and protection sectors, 
with investment to create the necessary databases.
To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
social security and protection spending, it is vital for 
evaluation to be institutionalized as a key management 
instrument in these sectors. Most of the region’s 
countries have recognized the importance of evaluation 
and created national systems of public investment. 
Almost invariably, however, evaluation activities are 
seen as just another formality that has to be complied 
with to obtain resource allocations. Valuation has not 
yet been positioned as an integral part of the public 
management process.
Within the public sectors of most of the countries, 
there is a need to re-engineer evaluation systems and 
procedures so that evaluation is positioned as part 
of a process of learning and continuously improving 
efficiency and effectiveness. Evaluation needs to be 
one of the standard administrative and management 
procedures of public institutions. These should be 
evaluating their programmes and projects and their 
management because they really believe that they will 
achieve better results and impacts in this way, and not 
just because funding bodies demand it.
(Original: Spanish)
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